The Turkish Competition Board Clears Amazon Turkey in Investigation into Automatic Pricing Mechanisms
The Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”) has published its decision in the investigation concerning the automatic pricing mechanism offered by Amazon Turkey Perakende Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi (“Amazon Turkey”) to third-party sellers on its marketplace. The Board ultimately concluded that Amazon Turkey did not infringe Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”) and decided not to impose an administrative monetary fine.
1. THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The investigation was opened ex officio in the context of a broader probe into automatic pricing mechanisms used by major multi-category e-marketplaces, following an earlier preliminary review into Hepsiburada’s practices. During that review, the Board observed that not only Hepsiburada but also Trendyol and Amazon Turkey offered automatic pricing tools to third-party sellers on their platforms.
In October 2023, the Board decided to open a full-fledged investigation against Trendyol, Hepsiburada and Amazon Turkey in relation to the use of automatic pricing mechanisms in the multi-category e-marketplace market. The Board conducted on-site inspections at all three platforms and obtained extensive data and internal documentation. During the investigation, all three undertakings initially expressed their willingness to offer commitments. Trendyol and Hepsiburada ultimately submitted commitment packages which the Board accepted, resulting in the termination of the investigation in respect of those undertakings.
Amazon Turkey, by contrast, chose not to pursue the commitment route. While it initially participated in the commitment discussions, Amazon Turkey subsequently withdrew its commitment offer, arguing that its automatic pricing mechanism was optional, pro-competitive and focused on improving consumer and seller outcomes. At the same time, Amazon Turkey informed the Board that it would phase out the automatic pricing mechanism in Türkiye and ultimately discontinue the tool for Turkish sellers. Despite this announcement, the Board decided to continue the investigation against Amazon Turkey and to assess the tool and its effects under Article 4 of Law No. 4054.
2. THE BOARD’S SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT
The core question considered by the Board was whether Amazon Turkey’s automatic pricing mechanism amounted to a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 4 of Law No. 4054, either by object (for example, as a tool facilitating resale price maintenance or co-ordination between competing sellers) or by effect (through a significant restriction of intra-platform or inter-platform competition). The Board also examined whether the agreements between Amazon Turkey and third-party sellers could benefit from the block exemption for vertical agreements or qualify for individual exemption.
In its report and subsequent additional opinion, the case team had argued that Amazon Turkey’s conduct fell within the scope of Article 4 and recommended the imposition of an administrative monetary fine. However, after assessing the entire evidentiary record – including the functioning of the mechanism, Amazon Turkey’s detailed written defences and the economic analysis conducted during the investigation – the Board ultimately departed from the case team’s recommendation.
In this context, the Board also sought the opinion of its Economic Analysis and Research Department (“EAAD”) on whether the automatic pricing mechanisms made available by the platforms to third-party sellers could give rise to co-ordination among sellers. EAAD’s analysis focused on the rule-based nature of the tools, their relatively low and intermittent usage rates, and the price dynamics observed for selected products and sellers over time. While EAAD did not identify evidence that Amazon Turkey’s automatic pricing mechanism had, in practice, led to anti-competitive co-ordination or price rigidity among sellers during the period under review, it underlined that « match »-type rules could, if their use became more widespread and stable, increase the risk of reduced price dispersion, price stickiness and, ultimately, co-ordination in the market.
The Board concluded in its decision that the automatic pricing mechanism, as implemented by Amazon Turkey and used by third-party sellers in the relevant period, did not give rise to sufficient evidence of an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 4. In particular, the Board did not consider that the mechanism as such resulted in prohibited resale price maintenance or collusive co-ordination between independent sellers at a level that would meet the characteristics of an infringement and justify an administrative monetary fine under Law No. 4054.
The Board further considered arguments relating to the applicability and potential withdrawal of block exemption, as well as the (in)applicability of the de minimis regime in the specific procedural context of the case. While these discussions are reflected in the decision, the Board’s dispositive reasoning rests on the conclusion that no infringement of Article 4 occurred in the first place; as a result, it did not proceed to impose any measures or sanctions on Amazon Turkey.
CONCLUSION
The decision under review is of significance in terms of the value it assigns to the questions of how algorithmic and automatic pricing mechanisms used on e-marketplace platforms should be characterised under competition law, in particular with respect to horizontal/vertical co-ordination and hub-and-spoke cartels, and how the specific effects of rule-based algorithms on the market should be assessed through economic analyses.
