Liability Beyond the Cartel: Individual Liability of Executives in Competition Law Infringements

In its decision dated 06.11.2025, numbered 25-41/1016-582, the Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”) initiated an investigation into allegations that True Özel Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti. (“True Danışmanlık”) participated as a cartel facilitator in price-fixing practices carried out among motor vehicle driving schools (“MVDS”) operating in the province of Aydın, in violation of Article 4 of the Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (the “Law”).

1.       FACTUAL BACKGROUND

HOW WAS THE PRICE-FIXING ARRANGEMENT ESTABLISHED?

In the case at hand, an investigation was conducted against True Danışmanlık, which was found to have coordinated price-fixing with the MVDS operating in the province of Aydın. The investigation also covered an executive of True Danışmanlık, who was assessed to have had a decisive influence on the implementation of the practices in question.

Evidence obtained during dawn raids revealed that the MVDS operating in the province of Aydın had collectively fixed trainee enrollment fees for various driving license categories and had implemented minimum price floors through protocols and supplementary protocols to ensure compliance with these prices. In this context, it was concluded that the executive of True Danışmanlık had assumed a supervisory role in the execution of the infringing agreement, managed its implementation, informed the parties, and participated in the infringement within the meaning of the Misdemeanors Law No. 5326. The same documents also set out penalty clauses to be applied in the event of deviation from the agreed prices, imposed sanctions through monetary fines and collection mechanisms, and stipulated that penalties would be escalated progressively in case of repeated violations.

Furthermore, in order to monitor and safeguard the established system, the MVDS that were party to the infringement issued promissory notes in favor of True Danışmanlık, which were enforced in the event of non-compliance with the agreed prices. It was also established that the MVDS made bank transfers to the executive of True Danışmanlık at various dates under the guise of membership fees. At the same time, the statements in the case file demonstrate that certain MVDS representatives were subjected to coercion and intimidation to participate in the price-fixing scheme.

2.     ASSESSMENT OF THE BOARD

2.1 Assessment under Article 4 of the Law

a) Cartel Characterization through Price-Fixing

Article 4 of the Law prohibits all agreements, concerted practices, and decisions of associations of undertakings that have as their object or effect, or potential effect, the restriction of competition between undertakings. Upon evaluation of the documents and evidence in the case file, it is observed that the MVDS operating in the province of Aydın collectively determined trainee fees for various driving license categories. Under competition law, such price agreements are characterized as cartels and are regarded as the most serious type of infringement. The existence of a cartel-type agreement or concerted practice, which constitutes the most serious competition law infringement, is sufficient to establish an infringement, and there is no need to prove its actual anti-competitive effects on the market. In this framework, the structure and functioning of the price-fixing system established among the MVDS is understood to constitute an explicit and systematic agreement/concerted practice aimed at price-fixing within the meaning of Article 4 of the Law.

b) Role of True Danışmanlık in the Cartel

The distinguishing aspect of the case at hand is that the protocols were not merely concluded among the undertakings themselves, but that the entire system was organized and operated through True Danışmanlık. The documents in the case file demonstrate that True Danışmanlık played a supervisory role in monitoring whether the protocols and other documents underpinning the price agreements were being complied with. In this context, it is understood that undertakings that deviated from the agreed prices were penalized and payment was demanded from them.

Under competition law, undertakings that are not direct parties to cartel activities but serve as intermediaries in the implementation and maintenance of such activities may also be held liable. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the practices of the MVDS that were party to the protocols constituted a restrictive price agreement within the framework of Article 4 of the Law, and that True Danışmanlık participated as a cartel facilitator pursuant to Article 3(1)(d) of the Active Cooperation Regulation and Article 14 of the Misdemeanors Law No. 5326, and was therefore held liable under Article 4 of the Law.

2.2 Scope of the Sanction: Individual Fines for Executives

Pursuant to Article 16 of the Law, in addition to the undertakings found to have committed a competition infringement, administrative fines may also be imposed on executives who have had a decisive influence on the infringement, in accordance with the Regulation on Administrative Fines to be Imposed in Cases of Restrictive Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions, and Abuse of Dominant Position (the “Fining Regulation”).

In the case at hand, the Board accepted the protocol dated 02.07.2021 as the starting point of the infringement and established that the infringement continued until the date of the investigation. Accordingly, the duration of the infringement was determined as 4-5 years, the base fine rate was set pursuant to Article 5 of the Fining Regulation, and the fine was increased taking into account the duration of the infringement and aggravating factors.

Article 8 of the Fining Regulation provides that “where an administrative fine is imposed on undertakings or associations of undertakings under this Regulation, an administrative fine of up to five percent of the fine imposed on the undertaking or association of undertakings may be imposed on the executives or employees of such undertaking or association of undertakings who are found to have had a decisive influence on the infringement.” This provision makes it clear that administrative fines may also be imposed on executives who have had a decisive influence on infringements falling within the scope of Article 4 of the Law.

Upon evaluation of the documents obtained during the dawn raids, it was established that the executive of True Danışmanlık had coerced certain undertakings into joining the price-fixing arrangement, conducted auditing activities on the MVDS in connection with the price-fixing arrangement, received payments related to the monitoring and enforcement of the price-fixing arrangement as evidenced by bank receipts, and had a decisive influence in organizing the auditing activities and the implementation of the protocols. As a result, an administrative fine was imposed on the executive of True Danışmanlık.

3.     CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Board’s decision reaffirms once again that competition law is not limited to undertakings that are direct parties to an infringement, but that actors who facilitate, organize, and contribute to the maintenance of an infringement will also be held equally liable. In the present case, the characterization of True Danışmanlık as a cartel facilitator and its being held liable under Article 4 of the Law is a concrete reflection of the Board’s broad interpretation adopted towards such structures.

On the other hand, the concept of individual fines, which the Board had not applied in its practice for a long time, re-emerges in this decision. In particular, this fine imposed on executives who had a decisive influence on the infringement demonstrates that this sanction does not merely exist in theory but also has practical application when the circumstances warrant it. Accordingly, the imposition of an individual administrative fine on the executive of True Danışmanlık pursuant to Article 8 of the Fining Regulation reveals the functional scope of individual liability of executives in competition law and clearly demonstrates that natural persons who have had a decisive influence on the commission or continuation of an infringement cannot be exempted from sanctions.