Associé
Analyses & décryptages
Türkiye Newsletter No.26 | Competition market overview
This competition law newsletter provides an overview of the latest developments in relation to the Turkish competition market and the implementation of Law No 4054 on the Protection of Competition (the « Law« ) in light of recent announcements and publications by the Competition Authority (the « Authority« ) and as well as decisions issued by the Competition Board (the « Board« ) during January 2026.
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Recently Initiated Investigations
- Corporate Engineering Software Solutions: The Board has launched an investigation pursuant to Article 41 of the Law to determine whether the Dassault Group (comprising Dassault Systemes SE, Dassault Systemes International SAS, Dassault Systemes SolidWorks Corporation, and Dassault Systemes Istanbul Innovation Technology Ltd. Co.) violated Article 4 of the Law by restricting customers in various ways and setting resale prices through its dealership channel. The Board, which discussed the information, documents, and findings obtained during the preliminary investigation at its meeting on 4 December 2025, found the findings to be serious and sufficient and decided to open an investigation against Dassault with the number 25-45/1110-M.
- Optical and Eye Health Products: The Board has launched an investigation into EssilorLuxottica S.A. (« ESSI-LUX« ) following a preliminary investigation conducted under Articles 4 and 6 of the Law. The investigation concerns allegations that ESSI-LUX may have engaged in anti-competitive practices in the markets for the wholesale distribution of ophthalmic lenses and contact lenses, as well as in the production and distribution of optical machinery and related consumables. The Board will assess whether certain commercial practices may have led to de facto exclusivity in the relevant markets.
- Cosmetics: The Board has initiated an investigation against Carex Bitkisel Ürünler ve Kozmetik Sanayi Ticaret AŞ, Farma Plus İlaç Bant Sağlık ve Kozmetik Ürünleri Sanayi Ticaret Ltd. Şti. and Digital Farma İlaç Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti., which together constitute an economic entity, to determine whether they have violated Article 4 of the Law by determining resale prices and restricting online sales. The Board discussed the information, documents and findings obtained in the preliminary investigation at its meeting on 18 December 2025. It found the findings to be serious and sufficient, and so decided to open an investigation under number 25-48/1164-M.
- Seedlings: The Board has launched an investigation into May-Agro Tohumculuk San. ve Tic. AŞ (“MAY TOHUM”) following a preliminary examination conducted under Article 4 of the Law. The investigation concerns allegations that MAY TOHUM determined resale prices and restricted its buyers’ regions and/or customers, thereby potentially infringing competition law.
Completed Investigations
Here is a summary of concluded investigations that resulted in administrative fines, specifying the nature of the violation and the administrative fines imposed:
| No | Name of the Undertaking | Type of Violation | Administrative Fine (TRY) |
| 1. | Koruma Klor Alkali Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, 2S Kimya Arıtma Tarım İnşaat Gıda Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi and Aykimsan Hiçyılmaz Kimyasal Ürünler İnşaat Gıda Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Şirketi together forming an economic entity, Irmak Kimya Sanayi ve Turizm Nakliyat Tarım Ürünleri ve Geri Dönüşüm Ticaret Limited Şirketi, Süleyman Kimya Arıtım İnşaat Nakliye ve Tehlikeli Madde Danışmanlığı Hizmetleri Sanayi Ticaret Limited Şirketi, Kuzey Test Analiz Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Şirketi and Nalan Uslu-Anadolu Kimya | Acting in Collusion in Public Procurement Tenders | 333,317,215.40 |
| 2. | Koruma Klor Alkali Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ | Abuse of a Dominant Position | 164,484,083.28 |
SUMMARY OF KEY DECISIONS
Decision on Undertakings Operating in the Production and Sale of Milk and Dairy Products[1]
The Board adopted an interim measures decision in the context of its investigation concerning undertakings operating in the production and sale of milk and dairy products.
The investigation was initiated to examine allegations that the undertakings coerced livestock farmers into “feed in return for milk” schemes. Under these arrangements, farmers were allegedly required to purchase animal feed from certain suppliers as a condition for the purchase of their raw milk. Such practices were considered capable of restricting competition in both the raw milk market and the animal feed market.
The interim measures decision was adopted within the framework of a broader preliminary investigation into potential price fixing, market/customer allocation and the exchange of competitively sensitive information in the raw milk, feed and dairy products markets. During this process, the Authority obtained documents indicating that certain farmers were being forced into these tied arrangements.
In light of these findings, and given the conditions for interim measures set out under Article 9(4) of the Law — namely the existence of a strong suspicion of infringement and the risk of serious and irreparable harm — the Board concluded that interim relief was necessary.
Accordingly, pending the final decision on the merits, the Board ordered the investigated undertakings:
(i) not to impose any quantity and/or brand obligations on producers within the scope of “feed in return for milk” schemes, and
(ii) to comply with the relevant provisions of the Raw Milk Production Contract.
In addition, the Board required the undertakings to periodically submit invoices and related documentation concerning raw milk purchases and feed sales, and to inform raw milk producers of the interim measures through a dedicated information note. The Board further stated that a failure to comply with these obligations may result in administrative fines pursuant to Article 17 of the Law.
Decision on Lesaffre Turquie Mayacılık Üretim ve Ticaret AŞ[2]
The Board concluded its investigation concerning Lesaffre Turquie Mayacılık Üretim ve Ticaret AŞ in relation to allegations that certain undertakings active in yeast production and distribution engaged in price fixing and customer/territory allocation, and that Lesaffre facilitated the implementation and continuity of such practices.
Based on the findings obtained during the investigation, the Board determined that distributors established a cartel through price coordination and customer sharing, and that Lesaffre played a facilitating and coordinating role in maintaining this arrangement. The conduct was therefore classified as a cartel within the meaning of Article 4 of the Law.
The Board also noted that the undertaking had previously been found to have infringed Article 4 of the Law, and therefore treated the conduct as a repeat infringement when calculating the fine.
During the investigation, Lesaffre applied for both leniency and settlement. The Board granted reductions under the Active Cooperation Regulation and the Settlement Regulation. As a result, an administrative fine was imposed and the investigation was terminated through a settlement.
Decision on Vava Cars Turkey Otomotiv AŞ[3]
The Board concluded its investigation concerning Vava Cars Turkey Otomotiv AŞ in relation to allegations that it entered into anti-competitive agreements in the context of search-based online advertising.
The investigation focused on whether Vava Cars and certain competing undertakings operating in the online second-hand vehicle trading market ha mutually agreed to add each other’s brand names to negative keyword lists within Google Ads. The Board assessed that such reciprocal “negative matching” arrangements prevented the undertakings’ advertisements from appearing in response to searches containing competitors’ brand names, thereby restricting competition in the online advertising space linked to the second-hand vehicle market.
Following its assessment, the Board determined that the mutual negative keyword practices constituted an agreement restricting competition within the meaning of Article 4 of the Law.
During the investigation, Vava Cars applied for settlement under Article 43 of the Law. Upon accepting the existence and scope of the infringement, the Board granted a reduction pursuant to the Settlement Regulation. As a result, an administrative fine was imposed and the investigation was terminated with respect to Vava Cars through a settlement.
Decision on Armtek, ATS, Europower and Girişim[4]
The Board concluded its investigation concerning several undertakings operating in the production and sale of control and protection panels used in electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure.
The investigation focused on allegations that the undertakings coordinated their bids in tenders organised by various electricity distribution companies, including through price coordination, collusive bidding and market sharing. The case file included extensive evidence obtained during on-site inspections, indicating that competitors exchanged information regarding tender prices, agreed on bid levels and discussed how to allocate tenders among themselves.
The Board assessed that such conduct constituted collusive tendering and price coordination within the meaning of Article 4 of the Law.
The investigation was concluded through the settlement procedure with respect to Armtek Elektrik Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, ATS Elektrik Pano Sanayi Ticaret Ltd. Şti., Europower Enerji ve Otomasyon Teknolojileri Sanayi Ticaret AŞ and Girişim Elektrik Sanayi Taahhüt ve Ticaret AŞ. Following the undertakings’ acceptance of the existence and scope of the infringement, the Board applied reductions under the Settlement Regulation.
As a result, administrative fines were imposed on the undertakings concerned and the investigation was terminated through a settlement.
Establishment of joint control over Fortuna Topco Limited by Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance and Fidentia[5]
The Board authorised the establishment of joint control by Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Ltd. (“SFMI”) and Fidentia over Fortuna Topco Limited, which was previously solely controlled by Fidentia Fortuna Holdings Ltd., and ultimately controlled by Centerbridge Partners LP. The Board found that the transaction constitutes a notifiable concentration resulting in a permanent change of control, as SFMI would obtain decisive veto rights over key strategic matters and the governance framework requires both shareholders’ participation for valid board decision-making.
In its competitive assessment, the Board examined the parties’ activities in non-life reinsurance (horizontal overlap) and non-life insurance / reinsurance (potential vertical relationship). Given the parties’ limited market presence and the competitive market structure, the Board concluded that the transaction would not significantly restrict effective competition in Türkiye and granted clearance.
Acquisition of sole control over Antalya Alkollü İçecek Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ by Türk Tuborg Bira ve Malt Sanayi AŞ[6]
The Board authorised the acquisition of sole control over Antalya Alkollü İçecek Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ by Türk Tuborg Bira ve Malt Sanayi AŞ through a share transfer. The Board found that the transaction constitutes a notifiable concentration resulting in a permanent change of control, as the relevant turnover thresholds were exceeded.
In its substantive assessment, the Board examined the parties’ activities in the alcoholic beverages sector, identifying a horizontal overlap in the liqueur market and considering potential portfolio and leveraging effects stemming from Tuborg’s strong position in beer distribution. Despite concerns raised by third parties regarding foreclosure risks, the Board concluded that market shares, competitive constraints and the presence of alternative suppliers prevent a significant restriction of effective competition, and therefore cleared the transaction.
Acquisition of joint control over YOOX Net-a-Porter Group S.p.A. by Farfetch Holdings plc and Compagnie Financière Richemont S.A.[7]
The Board authorised the acquisition of joint control over YOOX Net a Porter Group S.p.A. (“YNAP”) by Farfetch and Richemont through a share transfer. The Board found that the transaction constitutes a notifiable concentration, as it results in a permanent change of control and YNAP would operate as a full-function joint venture, with both parents exercising decisive influence over strategic decisions.
In its competitive assessment, the Board examined the parties’ activities in the retail of personal luxury goods, identifying horizontal overlaps at the retail level and a potential vertical relationship with wholesale supply. Given the parties’ low combined market shares, the fragmented and competitive market structure, and the presence of strong alternative players (both online and offline), the Board concluded that the transaction would not significantly restrict effective competition in Türkiye and granted clearance.
Acquisition of AstraZeneca’s Tensinor and Tenoretic licences by Abdi İbrahim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.[8]
The Board authorised the acquisition by Abdi İbrahim of the marketing authorisation rights for four cardiovascular products from AstraZeneca İlaç Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti. Although the transferred assets did not exceed the standard turnover thresholds, the transaction was deemed notifiable as it concerns pharmacology-related assets, qualifying as a technology undertaking.
The Board identified a horizontal overlap in the ATC-3 C07A (beta blockers) segment but found the parties’ combined market share to be low and the market to be highly competitive with numerous players. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the transaction would not significantly restrict effective competition in Türkiye and granted clearance.
GLOBAL ANTI-TRUST LAW UPDATES
European Commission publishes Guidelines under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation
The European Commission published new Guidelines under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), providing clarity on how it assesses distortive foreign subsidies, applies the balancing test between negative and positive effects, and uses its call-in powers for below-threshold concentrations and public procurement procedures.
The Guidelines explain the two-step distortion analysis (strengthening of competitive position and impact on market dynamics), introduce a structured approach for assessing subsidies in public tenders, and detail how positive effects are weighed against competitive harm. They also set out the Commission’s criteria for requesting prior notification of otherwise non-notifiable transactions, while introducing safe harbours (including subsidies below €4 million and low-value procurement). The aim is to enhance legal certainty, transparency and predictability for companies, while safeguarding a level playing field in the EU internal market.