Türkiye Newsletter No.30 | Competition market overview
This competition law newsletter provides an overview of the latest developments in relation to the Turkish competition market and the implementation of Law No 4054 on the Protection of Competition (the “Law”) in light of recent announcements and publications by the Competition Authority (the “Authority”) and as well as decisions issued by the Competition Board (the “Board”) during June and July 2026.
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Investigations and Concluded with Commitments
- Subscription-Based Video-on-Demand Platforms: The Board concluded its investigation into NETFLIX, BLUTV, DISNEY, AMAZON PRIME, EXXEN and GAIN concerning their practices in subscription-based video-on-demand services. The investigation examined whether NETFLIX engaged in discriminatory practices in the selection of independent producers for Netflix-branded Turkish content and imposed unfair contractual terms on Turkish producers, as well as exclusivity provisions concerning content and talent in agreements concluded by the investigated platforms. The investigation was terminated after the Board accepted and made binding a comprehensive set of commitments submitted by the undertakings. NETFLIX committed, among other measures, to increase opportunities for producers that had not previously worked with NETFLIX, introduce transparent procedures for the selection and assessment of Turkish content, shorten exclusivity periods for branded and non-branded Turkish content and refrain from imposing exclusivity obligations on actors, directors, screenwriters and other talent. DISNEY, BLUTV, AMAZON, EXXEN and GAIN similarly committed to limit content exclusivity periods and provide producers, under certain conditions, with mechanisms such as revenue sharing or the possibility of shortening exclusivity periods, as well as to refrain from talent exclusivity arrangements and from agreements imposing non-compete obligations on Turkish producers or distributors or granting exclusivity over all content produced by a producer. The commitments were made binding, and the investigation was terminated with the Board’s decision dated 30 April 2026 (26-16/498-181).
- Soft Drinks (Coca-Cola): The Board concluded its investigation into Coca-Cola Satış ve Dağıtım AŞ (“CCSD”) concerning alleged violations of Articles 4 and 6 of the Law through exclusivity and rebate practices allegedly foreclosing rivals. The investigation was terminated after the Board accepted and made binding a comprehensive set of commitments submitted by CCSD. In particular, the existing cooler access rule was expanded, requiring 35% of each CCSD cooler in traditional and on-premise channels to be made available to rival products, while additional measures were introduced to ensure the effective allocation and visibility of the reserved space. CCSD also committed to discontinue its cooler efficiency practice linking the provision of coolers to minimum annual purchase volumes, revise its target and incentive schemes, and restructure investment support for points of sale so that it is based on objective criteria and independent from product purchase obligations. In addition, discounts granted to distributors will be determined separately for each product category based on objective criteria and may not be tied to the purchase, sale or display of products in another category, while free-product support in the water and soda categories will be abolished. The commitments were made binding by the Board’s decision dated 4 June 2026 and will be reviewed by the Board after three years (26-20/614-243).
- Uber/Getir Transaction: In the field of digital platforms and quick commerce, the Board approved the acquisition by Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber”) of sole control over (i) the online food ordering and delivery business and (ii) the quick commerce business of Getir Perakende Lojistik A.Ş., conditional upon commitments. In particular, Uber committed to investing a total of USD 500 million in Türkiye. This investment is expected to foster high-skilled employment, reinforce local engineering capabilities and contribute positively to the development of Türkiye’s digital and technology infrastructure.
The reasoned decision will be published on the Board’s website in due course and is expected to provide further insight into the Board’s assessment of conglomerate and vertical effects in digital ecosystems, as well as its approach to behavioural and investment-related remedies. - Meta/Threads Reintroduction in Türkiye: The Board has found that Meta’s application concerning the reintroduction of the Threads application in Türkiye complies with the commitments made binding by its decision dated 7 November 2024 and numbered 24-45/1053-450. Under these commitments, users will be able to use Threads either through their Instagram account or independently by creating a Threads profile using a mobile phone number, without requiring an Instagram account. For users who choose to use Threads independently, personal data obtained from their Instagram accounts will not be combined with data obtained through Threads. The Board reached this conclusion by its decision dated 10 June 2026 and numbered 26-21/626-256.
Recently Initiated Investigations
- Nuclear Medicine Services: The Board has initiated an investigation into 11 undertakings active in nuclear medicine to determine whether they have violated Article 4 of the Law by engaging in collusive conduct or concerted practices, particularly in tenders conducted by public hospitals. The investigation focuses on the undertakings’ conduct in PET/CT and FDG tenders and the potential effects of such conduct on competition. PET/CT is an advanced nuclear medicine imaging method of critical importance in the diagnosis and monitoring of cancer, while FDG is one of the principal radiopharmaceuticals used for imaging purposes. The services concerned may also include the installation of imaging equipment and the provision of operating personnel. The Board will assess the undertakings’ bidding behaviour and the competitive conditions in the relevant tenders (26-16/481-M).
Completed Investigations
- Tire Production and Distribution Sector: The Board concluded its investigation into undertakings active in the production and distribution of automotive tires, examining allegations of coordinated pricing, exchange of competitively sensitive information, resale price maintenance, territorial and customer restrictions, discriminatory practices, non-compete obligations, and labour-market restrictions, including no-poach arrangements. Following settlement proceedings involving seven undertakings, the Board imposed fines totalling TRY 497,091,986.13. In its final decision dated 4 June 2026 and numbered 26-20/612-242, the Board imposed additional fines totalling TRY 3,136,843,185.19 on manufacturers, suppliers and distributors, bringing the total fines imposed in the investigation to TRY 3,633,935,171.32.
The Board also imposed compliance measures aimed at preventing indirect exchanges of future pricing information through dealers. These measures require, among other things, the use of dealer-specific watermarks on price-related communications, the replacement of group-wide communications with dealer-specific portals, and contractual provisions prohibiting dealers from sharing forward-looking pricing information with competing manufacturers or dealers. The Board also found that certain allegations were either unsubstantiated or time-barred and held that a non-compete obligation imposed by Brisa in the forklift tire market benefited from the applicable block exemption.
Here is a summary of concluded investigations that resulted in administrative fines, specifying the nature of the violation and the administrative fines imposed:
| No | Name of the Undertaking | Type of Violation | Administrative Fine (TRY) |
| 1 | Kast Ajansları Derneği and undertakings operating in the casting agency /management sector | Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information and Coordination on Commission Rates and Service Conditions | 42,163,586.70 |
| 2. | Abdulkadir Özcan Otom. Lastik. San. Tic. A.Ş. | Resale Price Maintenance and Customer Restrictions and Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information in labor market | 396,868,582.22 |
| Üstündağ Lastik İthalat ve Ticaret A.Ş. | Resale Price Maintenance | 8,263,636.19 | |
| Tatko Lastik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information in Output Market and Labor Market | 67,720,838.07 | |
| Prolas Otom. Nak. Hırdavat San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. | Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information | 4,115,082,35 | |
| Özcanlar Lastik San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. | 7,499,380.35 | ||
| Kardeşler Ulaşım Jant Mot. Araçlar ve Servis Hizmetleri Ticaret Ltd. Şti. | 8,073,447.76 | ||
| Abdullah Özdoğan Ticaret Otomotiv Petrol İnşaat Makina Sanayi İthalat ve İhracat Ltd. Şti. | 4,551,019.19 | ||
| Aydın Lastik Sat. ve Ser. Hiz. Ltd. Şti. | 1,191,732.23 | ||
| Modül Lastik Otomotiv Ticaret A.Ş. | 1,204,191.51 | ||
| Brisa Bridgestone Sabancı Lastik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | Coordination on Price Movements, Customer Restrictions and Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information in Labor Market
|
1,019,069,577.64 | |
| Otomotiv Lastikleri Tevzi A.Ş. | Coordination on Price Movements, Customer Restrictions | 397,294,083.93 | |
| Goodyear Lastikleri Türk A.Ş. | Coordination on Price Movements, Customer Restrictions, Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information in Labor Market and No-poaching Agreements
|
672,292,698.43 | |
| Hankook Lastikleri A.Ş. | 361,481,610.39 | ||
| Pirelli Otomobil Lastikleri A.Ş. | 292,432.145.05 | ||
| Michelin Lastikleri Ticaret A.Ş. | Coordination on Price Movements | 185,113,328.77 | |
| Prometeon Turkey Endüstriyel ve Ticari Lastikler A.Ş. | Resale Price Maintenance and Customer Restrictions and Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information in labor market | 206,763,817.24 |
SUMMARY OF KEY DECISIONS
Decision Concerning Undertakings Active in the Hybrid Vegetable and Fruit Seed Markets[1]
The Board concluded its investigation into undertakings active in the hybrid vegetable and fruit seed markets, which examined whether the parties had infringed Article 4 of the Law through the exchange of competitively sensitive information and whether NUNHEMS and another undertaking had engaged in price fixing in the hybrid industrial gherkin seed market. The investigation covered communications between competitors concerning current and future price lists, sales strategies, sales volumes, stock levels, payment terms and market-size data. The Board found that these exchanges reduced the uncertainty that should exist between competitors and enabled the undertakings to take account of each other’s commercial strategies when determining their own market conduct. The Board also conducted an individual exemption review. The Board further concluded that the information exchange practices could not benefit from an individual exemption under Article 5 of the Law, as they did not generate sufficient efficiencies or consumer benefits and were not indispensable to achieving any such efficiencies.
The Board found that 16 undertakings had been involved in the investigation concerning the exchange of competitively sensitive information. Proceedings were concluded through settlement in respect of 12 undertakings, including Bayer, Hazera, HM Clause, Multi Tohum, NUNHEMS, Rito, Sakata, Semillas Fito, Syngenta, Vilmorin Mikado and Yüksel Tohum. The Board also found that NUNHEMS had participated in a price-fixing cartel in the hybrid industrial gherkin seed market. However, no administrative fine was imposed on NUNHEMS in respect of this conduct, as it had been granted full immunity under the active cooperation programme.
Acquisition of joint control over SOCAR Terminal by Terminal Investment Switzerland[2]
The Board cleared Terminal Investment Switzerland Sàrl’s acquisition of 50% of SOCAR Aliağa Liman İşletmeciliği A.Ş. (“SOCAR Terminal”). In defining the transaction parties, the Board notably found that the TIL Group, despite being jointly controlled by MSC and BlackRock, did not qualify as a full-function joint venture due to its commercial dependence on MSC and therefore treated only MSC, rather than BlackRock, as the relevant acquiring group.
The Board further examined the vertical relationship between SOCAR Terminal’s container terminal operations and MSC’s container liner shipping activities, focusing on potential input and customer foreclosure. In particular, it assessed whether SOCAR Terminal could restrict competing shipping lines’ access to terminal services and whether MSC could redirect its volumes to SOCAR Terminal to the detriment of competing terminals. Taking into account, among others, the availability and sufficient capacity of alternative terminals, as well as alternative customers, the Board concluded that neither scenario would significantly restrict competition and granted unconditional clearance.
Acquisition of sole control over CyberArk Software by Palo Alto Networks[3]
The Board approved Palo Alto Networks’ acquisition of all shares and sole control of CyberArk Software. The transaction brings together two global players in the cybersecurity sector: Palo Alto offers a broad portfolio covering network, cloud and security operations, while CyberArk focuses primarily on identity security solutions. The Board found that, although the parties’ activities overlap broadly in enterprise security software, their combined market shares in Türkiye remain limited and the market has a fragmented, multi-player structure.
The Board also assessed potential conglomerate effects, particularly whether the combined entity could restrict interoperability with competing products or engage in bundling or tying. Taking into account the widespread multi-vendor and interoperability practices in the sector, including customers’ ability to source solutions from multiple suppliers, the Board concluded that the transaction would not give rise to competition concerns and granted unconditional clearance.
Whaleco / TEMU Procedural Fines Decisions[4]
The Board adopted two separate procedural decisions concerning Whaleco Technology Limited and Whaleco Turkey Teknoloji AŞ in the context of a preliminary investigation into whether the TEMU platform intervened in sellers’ sales prices. In the first decision, the Board found that the on-site inspection attempted on 21 January 2026 had been obstructed because TEMU’s offices could not be accessed, no employee attended the premises to assist with the inspection, and the requested organizational chart was not provided. The Board therefore imposed an administrative fine equal to 0.05% of the undertakings’ 2024 gross revenue.
In the second decision, the Board found that TEMU had failed to provide, within the prescribed period, information concerning its revenue generated in Türkiye. After the information was submitted on 30 January 2026, the Board imposed a fixed administrative fine equal to 0.1% of the undertakings’ 2024 gross revenue, together with an additional daily fine equal to 0.05% for each of 28 and 29 January 2026. Both decisions concerned procedural non-compliance and did not address the merits of the underlying allegations concerning TEMU’s pricing practices.
DHL / FedEx Turkey Vertical Restraints Decision[5]
The Board adopted its decision dated 16 March 2026 and numbered 26-10/307-119 following the annulment of its earlier decision concerning DHL Worldwide Express Taşımacılık ve Ticaret AŞ (“DHL”) and TNT International Express Taşımacılık Ticaret Ltd. Şti. (now FedEx Express Turkey). The annulment followed the Council of State’s decisions of 15 October 2025, which overturned the appellate judgments upholding the original decision, and the subsequent judgments of the Ankara Regional Administrative Court dated 25 February 2026, which annulled the Board’s decision.
The Board nevertheless confirmed that DHL and FedEx Turkey had infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by restricting the ability of their resellers to provide services to customers of the relevant vertically related undertakings. The Board found that the restrictions covered both active and passive sales and were not based on objectively defined exclusive customer groups, meaning that the arrangements could not benefit from the applicable block exemption.
As part of its reassessment, the Board compared the fines calculated under the new Fining Regulation with those imposed under the repealed regulation. Since applying the new rules would have resulted in significantly higher fines, the Board applied the prohibition against aggravating the position of an appellant and maintained the lower fines previously imposed on DHL and FedEx Express Turkey.
GLOBAL ANTI-TRUST LAW UPDATES
European Commission Fines Google €890 Million for Breaches of the Digital Markets Act
On 23 July 2026, the European Commission imposed two fines totalling €890 million on Google for non-compliance with the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”). The Commission fined Google €460 million for self-preferencing its own services on Google Search and a further €430 million for restricting app developers’ ability to direct users to alternative purchasing channels outside Google Play.
Regarding Google Search, the Commission found that Google gave its own shopping, hotel, transport and sports services more prominent placement than comparable third-party services, including through top-ranking positions, enhanced visuals and filters. The Commission considered this to breach the DMA requirement that gatekeepers apply fair, transparent and non-discriminatory ranking conditions to their own and third-party services.
The second infringement concerned Google’s “anti-steering” practices on Google Play. The Commission found that app developers were not free to inform users of alternative, often cheaper offers, promote those offers or conclude transactions through other channels, including websites and third-party app stores. While Google may charge a fee for facilitating the initial acquisition of a customer through Google Play, the Commission concluded that the level and duration of Google’s steering-related fees went beyond what is permitted under the DMA.
In addition to the fines, the Commission ordered Google to end the infringements. Google must treat third-party services appearing in Google Search on an equal and non-discriminatory basis and must allow app developers to communicate, promote offers and conclude contracts with users both within and outside the Google Play environment. The Commission noted that Google had proposed and begun testing changes to its search presentation, shopping advertisements and steering terms, but stated that these measures would continue to be assessed.
Google must comply with the decisions within 60 days. Failure to do so may result in periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of its total worldwide turnover. The Commission stated that the fines reflected the gravity, duration and recurrence of the breaches, and Google may appeal the decisions.
European Commission Clears Paramount’s Acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery Subject to Conditions
On 22 July 2026, the European Commission approved, under the EU Merger Regulation, Paramount Skydance Corporation’s (“Paramount”) proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery (“Warner”), subject to full compliance with commitments offered by Paramount. The parties are active in the production and distribution of films and audiovisual content, including television series and streaming services. The Commission examined the transaction in relation to film production and distribution, audiovisual content licensing, wholesale television channels and retail audiovisual services.
The Commission did not identify significant concerns about film production or wider audiovisual content levels, as sufficient alternative competitors would remain in the EEA. However, it found that the transaction could lead to high concentration and increased transparency in certain EEA countries where Paramount has a structural partnership with Universal through United International Pictures (“UIP”). Without remedies, the addition of Warner’s film portfolio to the UIP distribution structure could have resulted in less favourable distribution terms for cinema operators and, ultimately, disadvantages for consumers.
To address these concerns, Paramount committed to withdraw from UIP’s EEA operations and licensees within 13 months of closing and, for ten years, not to jointly distribute films with Universal in the EEA or shift the distribution of Paramount or Warner films to distributors also handling Universal’s or Disney’s films in the relevant countries. An independent trustee will monitor compliance with the commitments. Following a positive market test, the Commission concluded that the transaction, as modified by the remedies, would no longer raise competition concerns.
