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Newsletter No.21 | Competition market overview
This competition law newsletter provides an overview of the latest developments in relation to the Turkish competition market and the implementation of Law No 4054 on the Protection of Competition (the “Law”) in light of recent announcements and publications by the Competition Authority (the “Authority”) and as well as decisions issued by the Competition Board (the “Board”) in April and May 2025.
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Recently Initiated Investigations
- Agriculture and Organic Food: The Board has launched an investigation against undertakings in the packaged milk and production of milk sector to determine whether there has been a violation of Article 4 of the Law due to price fixing and competition-sensitive information exchange.
- Media: The Board has initiated an investigation against Apple Teknoloji ve Satış Ltd. Şti., Fintegre Teknoloji Ticaret A.Ş., Media Markt Turkey Ticaret Ltd. Şti., Teknosa İç ve Dış Ticaret A.Ş., Artı Bilgisayar Satış ve Eğitim Hizmetleri İnşaat Makine Sanayi A.Ş., Gürgençler Bilişim İletişim İç ve Dış Ticaret A.Ş. and Easycep Bilişim ve Ticaret A.Ş, to determine whether there has been a violation of Article 4 of the Law through the restriction of competition via the exchange of competition-sensitive information.
Other Industries
- The Board has opened an investigation against Çamsan Entegre Ağaç Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., Kastamonu Entegre Ağaç Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., Kronospan Orman Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. to determine whether there has been a violation of Article 4 of the Law by engaging in anti-competitive coordination in the procurement of raw materials.
- The Board has launched an investigation against Varta Pilleri Ticaret Ltd. Şti. to determine whether there has been a violation of Article 4 of the Law in relation to price fixing and restricting on internet sales.
- The Board has initiated an investigation against Anadolu Kılavuzluk A.Ş., Arpaş Ambarlı Römorkaj Pilotaj A.Ş., Deniz Kılavuzluk A.Ş., Marin Römorkör ve Kılavuzluk A.Ş., Sanmar Denizcilik Makina ve Tic. A.Ş., Uzmar Uzmanlar Denizcilik Tic. ve San. Ltd. Şti. to determine whether there has been a violation of Article 4 of the Law.
Completed Investigations
Below is a summary of concluded investigations that resulted in administrative fines, including the nature of violation and the amounts imposed:
| No | Name of the Undertaking | Violation Type | Administrative Fine (TRY) |
| 1. | Ceyhan Hazır Beton İnş. Nak. Mad. Petrol Ürünleri Paz. San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. | Resale Price Maintenance
Sharing Customers/Regions |
515,861.74 |
| 2. | Filitoğlu İnş. Petrol Gıda Turizm Nak. San. ve Tic. A.Ş. | 103,076.62 | |
| 3. | OYAK Çimento Fabrikaları AŞ | Resale Price Maintenance | 110,564,108.16 |
| 4. | Kadir Soylu Beton Demir İnşaat Petrol Ürünleri San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. | ||
| 5. | M.M. Tiftik Kardeşler Nakliye İnşaat Emlak Petrol ve Tarım Ürünleri Pazarlama San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. | ||
| 6. | Ekintaş İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ | ||
| 7. | Biota Bitkisel İlaç ve Kozmetik Laboratuarları A.Ş.
Derma Cos İlaç Medikal ve Kozmetik Sanayi ve İç Ticaret A.Ş. Derma-Cos Kozmetik Sanayi Ticaret İthalat ve İhracat Ltd. Şti. |
Resale Price Maintenance | 31,395,633.86 |
| 8. | Saros Hazır Beton İnş. Madencilik San. ve Tic. A.Ş. | Competition-Sensitive Information Exchange
Resale Price Maintenance
|
5,406,988.88 |
| 9. | Serin Beton İnş. Taah. İnş. Malz. Hafr. Taş. Gıda San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti | 3,831,807.55 | |
| 10. | Zofunlar Beton Üretim Pazarlama San. ve Tic. A.Ş. | 986,382.05 | |
| 11. | Erikli Su ve Meşrubat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | Competition-Sensitive Information Exchange | 21,106,469.63 |
| 12. | Pınar Su ve İçecek Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 4,877,401.33 | |
| 13. | Batıbeton Sanayi A.Ş. | Resale Price Maintenance
|
37,851,666.03 |
| 14. | Öztürk Ticaret | 28,308.08 | |
| 15. | Şölen Çimento Yapı İnş. San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. | 1,216,947.91 | |
| 16. | Çimentaş İzmir Çimento Fabrikası Türk AŞ | Sharing Customers/Regions | 37,370,945.14 |
SUMMARY OF KEY DECISIONS
Volta Motor Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. Decision[1]
The Board initiated an investigation against Volta Motor Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. based on allegations of a violation of Article 4 of the Law, namely by determining resale prices through direct interference with the pricing behavior of factory outlets and dealers.
During the investigation, it was claimed that Volta Motor Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş restricted passive sales from factory outlet stores and dealers by offering products for sale through Yeni Mağazacılık AŞ (“A101”), one of its distribution channels, and then allowing factory outlet stores and dealers to sell products after those at A101 had been sold out, thereby abusing its dominant position by engaging in predatory pricing within the meaning of Article 6 of the Law.
As a result of its assessment, the Board found that Volta Motor Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. had violated Article 4 of the Law. However a commitment letter was submitted by Volta Motor Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., as it may cause competitive concerns for the future periods. In the commitment letter, Volta undertook that distributors would be free to engage in both active and passive sales and there would be no interference with distributors within the scope of the Distributor Agreement.
Hamzaoğlu Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş. Decision[2]
The Board initiated an investigation into Hamzaoğlu Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (“HAKS”) based on allegations of a violation of Article 4 of the Law, specifically for determining resale prices of buyers and restricting online sales.
During the investigation, it was found that HAKS closely monitored the implementation of its desired prices in the market, intervened with resellers that did not comply with the set resale prices, and exerted pressure by threatening to suspend product supply or terminate the commercial relationship if price adjustments/revisions were not made. Accordingly, the Board decided to impose an administrative fine on HAKS for violating Article 4 of the Law.
Concrete manufacturers operating in Adana and Osmaniye Decision[3]
The Board launched an investigation into Çimsa Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., KÇS Kahramanmaraş Çimento Beton San. ve Mad. İşl. A.Ş., Samet Hazır Beton İnşaat Madencilik Lojistik Enerji Ltd. Şti. based on allegations of a violation of Article 4 of the Law through price fixing and customer and/or regional allocation.
During the investigation, it was found that concrete manufacturers operating in Adana and Osmaniye restricted orders by sharing customers and/or regions. It was understood that these undertakings were allocated specific regions, and within those areas, they were free to sell to any customer at any price, effectively restricting competition.
Based on its assessment, the Board decided to impose an administrative fine on Samet Hazır Beton İnşaat Madencilik Lojistik Enerji Ltd. Şti. for violating Article 4 of the Law .
Acquisition of Kayhan Ertuğrul Makina Sanayi and Ticaret AŞ ile Terramak Tarım Makinaları Dış Ticaret AŞ. [4]
The Board authorised the acquisition of 100 % of the shares and sole control of Kayhan Ertuğrul Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. and Terramak Tarım Makinaları Dış Ticaret A.Ş. by Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş. The Board authorised the transaction as there was horizontal or vertical overlap between the parties’ activities in the tractor and harvesting equipment markets in Türkiye but the transaction was not expected to result in a significant lessening of effective competition. In this regard, the Board took into account the competitive structure of the market and the presence of strong competitors in the both segments.
Acquisition of Paynet Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş.[5]
The Board approved the acquisition of sole control over Paynet Ödeme Hizmetleri A.Ş. through the purchase of all its shares by İyzi Ödeme ve Elektronik Para Hizmetleri A.Ş., a company ultimately controlled by Naspers Limited. The Board autorised the transaction as there was no horizontal or vertical overlap between parties’ activities in Türkiye and and the transaction was not expected to result in a significant lessening of effective competition in the virtual POS and card data storage markets. In this regard, the Board took into account the presence of numerous and strong competing undertakings with significant market shares.
Joint Venture of Petrol Ofisi A.Ş. and Ege Yeni Nesil Enerji Yatırım ve Yönetim A.Ş.[6]
The Board authorised establishment of a joint venture between Petrol Ofisi A.Ş. and Ege Yeni Nesil Enerji Yatırım ve Yönetim A.Ş., which will operate under their joint control in the field of biodiesel production. According to the parties’ statement, the joint venture was not established solely to increase supply, but rather to address logistical problems in the sector. The Board decided to authorise the transaction as there was horizontal and/or vertical overlap between the parties’ activities in Türkiye but the transaction was not expected to result in a significant lessening of effective competition.
Transfer of Sylvan International Biotechnology Co., Ltd. to Joint Control of KKR & Co. Inc. and Novo Holdings A/S[7]
The Board authorized the acquisition of Sylvan International Biotechnology Co., Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of KKR & Co. Inc., to the joint control of KKR & Co. Inc. and Novo Holdings A/S. The Board decided to authorise the transaction as there was no horizontal or vertical overlap between the parties’ activities in Türkiye and the transaction was not expected to result in a significant lessening of effective competition in the fungal technology markets. In this regard, the Board took into consideration the presence of numerous and strong competing undertakings with significant market shares.
Acquisition of Assets of Acorda Therapeutics Inc. by Merz Pharma GmbH & Co. KGaA[8]
The Board authorized the acquisition of certain assets of Acorda Therapeutics Inc. by Merz Pharma GmbH & Co. KGaA through Merz Pharmaceuticals, LLC. The Board decided to authorize the transaction as there was no horizontal or vertical overlap between the parties’ activities in Türkiye and the transaction was not expected to result in a significant lessening of effective competition in the ATC-3 and ATC-4 markets. In this regard, the Board took into consideration the presence of numerous and strong competing undertakings with significant market shares.
GLOBAL ANTI-TRUST LAW UPDATES
European Commission Imposes First DMA Fines on Apple and Meta[9]
The European Commission has imposed its first fines under the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”), amounting to a total of €700 million. The fines were levied against Apple (€500 million) and Meta (€200 million) for non-compliance with specific DMA obligations.
Apple was fined €500 million for infringing its obligations under the DMA by restricting app developers from steering users, free of charge, to alternative payment options outside the App Store ecosystem. Under Article 5(4) of the DMA, gatekeepers must allow app developers to direct users to external offers (e.g., via web links) without imposing any barriers. The Commission concluded that Apple’s conduct prevented developers from informing users about more attractive or cost-efficient offers available through other payment channels, thus undermining user choice and fair competition.
Meta was fined €200 million for its implementation of a “pay-or-consent” model on Facebook and Instagram during the period between March and November 2024. Under this model, users were required either to consent to the processing of personal data for personalised advertising or to pay for an ad-free experience. The Commission found that this binary choice did not provide a valid alternative that involves less extensive processing of personal data, as required by the DMA. Although Meta introduced a revised advertising model in November 2024, which allegedly involves the use of less personal data, the Commission is still assessing the compliance of this new model. The €200 million fine solely pertains to the preceding model.
Both Apple and Meta are now required to bring their conduct into full compliance within 60 days, or they may face additional penalties, including recurring penalty payments.
The French Competition Authority Sanctions Four Companies[10]
The French Competition Authority has sanctioned two distinct anti-competitive agreements involving no-poach practices. The first agreement was concluded between Ausy (now operating under the name Randstad Digital) and Alten, and the second between Expleo and Bertrandt. These agreements took the form of general no-poach “gentlemen’s agreements”, whereby the companies committed not to solicit or hire each other’s employees, thereby restricting a key parameter of competition in the labor markets where the parties operate.
The existence of these practices was brought to the attention of the Authority through a leniency application submitted by Ausy in April 2018, followed by dawn raids conducted in November 2018.
For the two established infringements, the Authority imposed a total fine of €29.5 million on Alten, Expleo, and Bertrandt. Ausy was granted full immunity from fines under the leniency program for having reported the infringement and cooperated with the investigation.
In addition to the financial sanctions, the Authority also required the parties to publish a summary of the decision on the professional social network LinkedIn, as well as in both the digital and print editions of the journal Le Monde Informatique.
European Commission Fines Carmakers in End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Cartel[11]
The European Commission has imposed fines totaling €458 million on 15 car manufacturers and the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) for participating in a long-running cartel related to end-of-life vehicle (ELV) recycling practices. Mercedes-Benz, which revealed the cartel under the Commission’s leniency program, was not fined. All parties acknowledged their participation and accepted the settlement.
The Commission found that between 2002 and 2017, major car manufacturers coordinated their behavior regarding ELV recycling in violation of EU competition rules. The companies agreed not to pay vehicle dismantlers for recycling, claiming the process was already profitable, and exchanged sensitive commercial information to align their market conduct.
Additionally, they collectively decided not to promote the use of recycled materials in new vehicles or disclose recyclability performance, aiming to avoid pressure from consumers and regulators to exceed legal requirements.
This conduct infringed both the ELV Directive and EU competition law by reducing transparency, suppressing innovation, and limiting consumer information.
Mercedes-Benz received full immunity from fines for first reporting the cartel. Other participants, including Stellantis, Mitsubishi, and Ford, benefited from reduced fines due to their cooperation during the investigation. Renault received an extra reduction for distancing itself from certain aspects of the agreement.
All parties accepted liability under the Commission’s settlement procedure, leading to a 10% fine reduction.
ACEA was also fined for facilitating the cartel, including organizing meetings and exchanges between the manufacturers.
Affected stakeholders may seek damages in national courts. The Commission’s decision serves as binding proof of the infringement under EU law. This case marks another significant application of both the leniency and settlement frameworks in EU antitrust enforcement.